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ABSTRACT 
The paper shows how the discovery of oil in Oloibiri in 1956 foisted clientelism on Nigeria and in the process, 
corruption and cronyism became normative. The exploration of oil in the Niger Delta region degraded the 
environment destroying ecosystem resulting in polluted fish ponds, drinking water sources and other means 
of livelihood. Additionally, the continuous flaring of gases has resulted in acid rain and other forms of 
diseases within the region. Using information from journals, library sources and online resources the paper 
argued using Immanuel Wallerstein’s systems theory that multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in 
the oil industry exploit the resources in the Niger Delta without investing commensurate resources in the 
region. This has not improved the poverty level as less than 5% of Niger Deltans work in the oil industry. 
The gender dynamic is even worse as less than 1% of Niger delta women work in the sector and most are 
holding pink jobs. The resultant effect is that the Nigerian economy continues to strink while development 
has become stunted. The paper posits that oil represents the ‘Dutch disease’ for Nigeria and Nigerians and 
has impelled underdevelopment. It avers that the misplaced priority of the ruling elites who are often drawn 
into the struggle for oil wealth that leaves them engrossed with what they can grab from the national cake 
which the oil wealth represents and not how to develop the nation frustrates all development agenda. It 
concludes that the intractable neglect of infrastructural facilities in Nigeria represents the flip-side of oil 
politics in Nigeria. 
Keywords: Politics, Oil, Challenge, Nigeria and Development. 
 
INTRODUCTION   
Nigeria is the largest oil and gas producer in Africa. The Delta basin contains two types of crude oil namely 
the Bonny light and the heavier type of crude.  Despite Nigeria’s oil wealth over 80 million (64%) Nigerians 
live below poverty line (UN, 2006).  The United Nations Common Country Analysis, (CCA) described 
Nigeria as one of the poorest and unequal country in the world despite its huge oil resources.  The United 
Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) to end extreme poverty by 2030 is unlikely to be met by 
Nigeria as there are no feasible policy in place to achieve the agenda. 
 
The World Bank Group Country Survey (2016) shows that Nigeria has overtaken India as the country with 
the most extreme poor people in the world. India has a population seven times larger than Nigeria’s. The 
struggle to alleviate extreme poverty is an indictment on successive Nigerian governments which have 
mismanaged the country’s vast oil riches through corruption and clientelism. The mismanagement of the oil 
resources has not only impoverished the Niger Delta region but has impelled a multiplicity of conflicts and 
all forms of brigandage in the Delta region. 
 
The 86.9 million Nigerians now living in extreme poverty represent nearly 45% of its estimated 196 million 
population (The World Poverty Clock 2018). As Nigeria faces a major population boom—it will become the 
world’s third largest country by 2050—its problems will likely worsen. But having large swathes of people 
still living in extreme poverty is an Africa-wide problem. 
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The Federal Republic of Nigeria is in West Africa, sharing borders with Benin in the west, Chad and 
Cameroon in the east and Niger in the north.  Its coast in the south lies on the Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic 
Ocean. Nigeria comprises 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. Nigeria is a heterogeneous state 
with over 374 ethnic groups but usually classified into the three major ethnic groups of Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba 
and Igbo.  Nigeria is blessed with diverse cultures and numerous languages (Olusakin, 2013).  Nigeria became 
an independent nation on the 1st of October, 1960 from Great Britain and became a republic in 1963.  Nigeria 
fought a civil war from 1967 to 1970 with the collapse of the first republic in 1966. At the end of the war the 
then government of General Yakubu Gowon embarked on the reconstruction of the infrastructure destroyed 
during the war with its slogan of “no victor no vanquished”.   Often referred to as the giant of Africa due to 
its large population of about 196 million and a potential to develop a thriving economy on account of its 
numerous natural resources and large market (Holmes, 1987), Nigeria, has been a huge disappointment with 
its decaying infrastructure and propensity for corruption making it impossible for government to deliver 
services to the people. The end of the civil war in 1970 resulted in a shift from agriculture to a near total 
dependence on crude oil as a source of foreign exchange.  The catalyst for this major shift was the energy 
crisis caused by the Arab embargo on the West for their support for Israel in the Yom Kippur war against 
Egypt which raised the price of crude from $3 to $12 a barrel (www.theguardian.com/environment/2011). 
Nigeria, became awash with petrodollars making the then Head of State General Yakubu Gowon to announce 
that the problem of Nigeria was not money but what to do with money.  The country embarked on numerous 
projects and importation of consumer goods. Unfortunately, most of the projects embarked upon by the 
successive governments were neither sustainable nor capable of creating the conditions for the country’s 
future industrialization. 
 
At independence in 1960, agriculture provided employment to over 75% of the population (Ilugbuhi, 1968). 
But the beginning of the oil boom had Nigeria, depending on almost a mono-product economy, as agriculture 
was neglected and jettisoned by many young people. Presently, oil accounts for nearly 90% of the foreign 
exchange earnings as the national budget depends heavily on the money realized from oil (Olusakin 2006). 
Before the discovery of oil, the economy had high potentials for growth, vitality and diversification as a 
variety of food and cash crops were cultivated including raw materials such as cotton for the textile sector. 
However, the oil boom stunted the diversification of the economy and the growth of other sectors thus making 
Nigeria a net importer of food (Olusakin, 2006). The concomitant is a sluggish and stunted economy without 
the prospects for job creation and sustainability. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The discovery of oil in Oloibiri in 1956 marked the genesis of Nigeria’s economic decline as the political 
elites who took over from the colonialists at independence in 1960 did not articulate a robust development 
plan to diversify the economy. The first Nigeria development plan was launched in 1962 with a six year 
target. This first development plan had inputs from both the UN and Ford Foundation. The plan was to lay 
emphasis on technical education, agriculture and industry with an envisioned GDP growth of 4 percent. 
However, the involvement of foreigners in the development of the plan was seen by critics as a recipe for 
failure as 50 percent of the resources needed to finance the plan was to be through foreign aids but only 14 
percent was received.  Unfortunately, the plan could not be implemented as it collapsed with the first republic 
in 1966 and the civil war in 1967. The end of the civil war in 1970 saw the launch of the second plan which 
covered the period 1970 to 1974 with emphasis on agriculture and industry. The third plan covered the period 
1975 to 1980. This was a very ambitious plan as it included the development of the rural areas and made an 
attempt to develop the agricultural sector. The fourth plan which covered the period 1981 to 1985 aimed at 
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improving social services and engendering better wellbeing of the people but unfortunately these lofty ideals 
were on paper as government made no effort to utilize the huge resources it earned from oil to lay the 
foundation for industrialization. Rather the government approved a huge salary raise for civil servants worked 
out by the Udoji commission. The windfall from the Udoji award led to the purchase of all manner of 
consumer goods resulting in inflation as there was more money in circulation than goods and services. There 
were other plans by successive governments such as vision 2010, the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy (NEEDS) initiated by the government of President Olusegun Obasanjo, vision 2020 
which aims at making Nigerian one of 20 great economies in the world. In spite of these blue prints Nigeria 
continues to be one-product economy depending on oil. The need to ascertain the reasons for Nigeria’s failure 
to develop impels the following questions: a. Is oil a curse or blessing for Nigeria?  b. How does the prevailing 
corruption in the industry affect development? c. How does leadership deficit affect Nigeria’s quest for 
development? The responses to the above questions are discussed in subsequent sections. Section one which 
comprises the introduction and the statement of problem brings to the fore the challenges of development in 
spite of oil resources; Section two situates the discourse within Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory 
while section three interrogates the nexus between militancy and the politics of oil; Section four discusses 
the prevalent corruption in the oil industry and the effects of leadership deficit on national development; 
Section five interrogates the impact of militancy with its attendant corruption on the oil industry and effects 
on national development; Section six examines the politics of oil in Nigeria while section seven concludes 
the discourse with necessary recommendations to ameliorate the situation. 
 
THEORETICAL ISSUES: Immanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory 
In his treatise on the capitalist world economy, Wallerstein (1974) likens the capitalist world economy as a 
system.  He avers that the system comprises many states with a built-in process of economic stabilization 
(Ritzer, 2008).  Whereas the members of the world system share the losses emanating therefrom, the 
economic gain is distributed to private hands. According to Wallerstein (1974), the core comprising the 
developed economies dominates the capitalist world economy and exploits the peripheral states.  The 
peripheral states provide raw materials to the core and are dependent and exploited by the core states. He 
argues that this international exploitation is exacerbated by the economic division of labour in the market. 
The periphery supplies unskilled labour to the core while the core is dominated by skilled workers. The 
activities in the core are highly specialized resulting in efficiency whereas the periphery is stagnated and 
characterized by a monoculture or an undifferentiated single-focus society (Wallerstein, 1974).  Nigeria is a 
good example of a monocultural economy which produces crude oil but unfortunately the core represented 
by developed states determines the price of crude to be bought from oil producers. Significantly, they also 
determine the price of refined crude and its derivatives to be sold to peripheral states. 
 
This asymmetrical relationship is replicated in peripheral states such as Nigeria as the Niger Delta where the 
bulk of oil is produced feels exploited and marginalized. The reason is that the Niger Delta region has suffered 
intense environmental degradation resulting from oil exploration and gas flaring. 
 
The absence of development in the Niger Delta region resulted in various crises and agitation starting from 
the rebellion led by the late Mr. Isaac Adaka Boro and the late Mr. Ken Saro Wiwa. In the first republic the 
percentage revenue due to oil producing states was 50% but this declined to 1% during the era of the military 
in the 1990s and subsequently increased to 13% to producing states (Revenue Allocation Report, 2012). But 
in spite of the 13% derivation, the politics of oil remains potent as producing states continue to agitate for a 
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fair treatment to engender development in the area because of the palpable poverty and environmental 
degradation.   
 
MILITANCY AND THE POLITICS OF OIL 
Militancy involves multi-pronged violent tendency and action. Militancy involves taking violent and 
rebellious actions against constituted authorities. According to Abraham (2011), 
militancy and youth restiveness in Nigeria manifest in the forms of disruption of activities of 
multinational oil corporations, vandalisation of oil pipelines, illegal bunkering and more 
recently, hostage taking of both expatriates and Nigerians alike, and destruction of oil 
installations. In the opinion of Ebienfa (2010), Nigeria is the Jewel in the African oil crown, but oil and 
militancy in the Niger Delta has become a subject of discussion just like the British 
weather. Previous studies indicated that whereas the oil produced in the Niger Delta, is the life 
blood of the Nigerian economy, oil has failed to translate to regional prosperity and development in the Niger 
Delta. The area has become a hot bed of violence, insurgency, kidnapping, hostage taking, oil pipeline 
sabotage, crude oil theft, gang wars, internecine struggles and so much else by way of anarchy and chaos 
(Afinotan & Ojakorotu, 2009; Ogundiya, 2009; Watts, 2008).  
 
Obviously, the agitation by the people of the Niger Delta for the fair share of the wealth 
generated in the region and the deprivation and neglect of the region by the government had 
caused and fueled the militancy. The literature is littered with a long list of the militant groups 
unleashing the orgy of violence in the region. Some of the notable militant groups are:  
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Ijaw National Congress (INC), 
the Niger Delta Force (NDF), the Niger Delta People‟s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the 
Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), the Niger Delta Liberation Army (NDLA), Coalition for Militant Action 
(COMA), Joint Revolution Council (JRC) which is a coalition of three militant groups namely; the Martyrs 
Brigade, MEND and NDPVF. Others are the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF) led by Ateke Tom, the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality in the Niger Delta (MOSIEND), the Ijaw Youth 
Council (IYC), the Urhobo Union, etc. (Egwemi, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2006). The violent 
activities of these groups have led to several shut-ins of oil facilities by the MNOCs and caused disruption in 
the production of oil.   
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THE STATES COMPRISING THE NIGER DELTA WITH ITS SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS. 
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Source: World Bank 2008 
Table 1 above comprises the socioeconomic indicators in the Niger Delta such as its population of 29 million 
with 40 ethnic groups and over 250 languages and dialects. Youth unemployment of 40% and poverty level 
of about 43%. This is abysmal considering that it contributes 80% of the country’s revenue.  
 
As one of  the world’s largest wetlands, and Africa’s largest delta, covering some 70 000 km2 the Niger Delta 
is rich   in both renewable and non- renewable resources such as oil, gas, bitumen, non-timber forest products 
and timber forest products, wildlife, etc (Badmus, 2010; Eyinla & Ukpo, 2006; Okaba, 2007; World Bank 
1995)..  Over 95 per cent of the total revenue for the Nigerian government is generated from oil and gas 
exploration (Brisibe, 2001).  The region is heterogeneous, multicultural, and ethnically diverse (Ogundiya, 
2009). Some of the ethnic groups in the region are the Izons (Ijaws), Isokos, Urhobos, Itsekiris, Ilajes, Ogonis, 
Andonis, Ibibios, Orons, Efiks, Anangs, Bekwaras, Ejaghams, Ekpeyes, Ikwerres, and many other splinter 
groups, spawning the eight littoral states of Nigeria (Long, 2007).  These ethnic nationalities are referred to 
as minorities in relation to the three major ethnic groups in the Nigerian Federation (Obi-Ani, 2004). The 
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Ijaws are one of the largest ethnic minorities in the Delta but stand at the heart of the oil fields (Watts, 2008).  
The population of the region is over 30 million people living in 13, 400 aboriginal communities. The people 
are mainly farmers and coastal fishermen, and belong to over 40 ethnic groups (Egwemi, 2009). There is no 
doubt that the region remains the wealth basket of Nigeria but despite these enormous natural resources 
available in the region, the people of the region continue  to wallow in abject poverty and squalor.  Following 
the failure of peaceful protests and agitations, they eventually took to arms against the Nigerian state to 
redress this ugly situation and the conflict has periled governance and development in Nigeria. 
 
CORRUPTION IN THE OIL INDUSTRY, LEADERSHIP DEFICIT AND NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
 Nigeria’s economic and social activities are anchored on oil but the sector is replete with corruption. The 
oil/gas sector is technology driven and highly dependent on technical expertise provided by multi-national 
corporations and few indigenous companies. The implication is that the oil sector attracts huge capital as 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The impact of the FDI is not felt in the economy as a result of corruption 
and a general lack of accountability (Usman, 2011, Aghalimo, 2006). Corruption which is defined as the 
misuse of public power for personal aggrandizement has permeated virtually all sectors of the Nigerian 
economy but more pronounced in the oil industry which is the mainstay of the economy. Apart from being 
categorized as the current headquarters of poverty in the world, Nigeria is heavily indebted in spite of its 
huge earning from oil. As at the end of 2018, its external debt stood at N22.37tn. Scholars such as (Sachs and 
Warner, 2001, Stiglitz, 2005, Okeke and Aniche, 2013) have attributed Nigeria’s underdevelopment to the 
“Dutch disease”- a malady that afflicts states with abundant natural resources. The argument is that the 
extraction of natural resources lowers the wealth of country except the generated funds are ploughed back to 
create sustainable wealth. The Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) has the proprietary right to 
issue oil licenses and manage joint venture projects and other contracts. It is also a major player as it exports 
crude oil and imports refined petroleum on behalf of the federal government. The allocation of licenses for 
exploration and prospecting without a regulated procedure for such awards is a recipe for corruption. The 
result is that licenses are awarded arbitrarily to friends and cronies. Oil bunkering or theft is another source 
of corruption in the sector. Marginalization, abject poverty and unemployment drove young Niger Deltans 
into various social vices such as oil theft through pipeline vandalisation, piracy, kidnapping and sea robbery 
but of all these the most lucrative is oil bunkering which has since expanded in scope with the indigenes 
accusing some elements in the military and the political class as aiding and abetting oil theft.  
 
The question often arises as to why Nigeria has failed to develop in spite of its rich human and natural 
resources. The leadership vacuum has often been blamed for its economic crises, political turmoil and the 
poverty of its citizenry. At independence in 1960, Nigeria had such sterling leaders as Nnamdi Azikiwe, 
Obafemi Awolowo, Ahmadu Bello, Tafawa Balewa, Michael Okpara, Aminu Kano, Anthony Enahoro etc. 
Unfortunately for Nigeria, it has not been lucky to have such leaders since the demise of those gentlemen. 
The leadership deficit has exacerbated the sharp ethnic division inherent in a heterogeneous society. Rather 
than galvanize the various ethnicities to coalesce into a strong and virile nation, we have leaders that exploit 
primordial cleavages to cling to power and amass resources for themselves and ethnic cronies. Any wonder 
that the economy continues to tank in the face of dwindling oil resources. The recourse to primordial identities 
has further driven a wedge into the major ethnic groups and brought to the fore ethnic champions who wish 
to use such platforms as a springboard to national prominence. Hence, the resurgence of ethnic and cultural 
associations such as IPOB, MASSOB, OPC, AREWA elders forum, MIYETTI-ALLAH cattle breeders 
association, militant groups in the Niger Delta-the AVENGERS, MEND, PANDEF etc. The resurgence of 
The Politics of Oil and the Challenge for the Development of Nigeria 
 
 
International Journal of Educational Research Vol. 6, No 1, 2019 
 
- 190 - 
ethnic cleavages robs the country of skilled professionals who would rather migrate to societies where their 
skills and expertise would be appreciated and rewarded accordingly.  
 
IMPACT OF MILITANCY AND CORRUPTION ON THE OIL INDUSTRY AND THE 
CHALLENGE FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. 
The Niger Delta communities have remained grossly socio-economically underdeveloped and pauperized 
amidst immense oil wealth owing to systematic dis-equilibrium in the production exchange relationship 
between the state, the multi-national corporations and the people. Enormous money derived from oil export 
has not translated into development for the region as a result of corruption and the absence of transparency 
resulting in severe land degradation, socio-economic disorganization, increasing poverty, misery, military 
occupation and bloody violence. (Pegg, 1999).  
 
The oil producing communities have basically remained dependent and underdeveloped, persistently dis-
empowered, socio-culturally marginalized and psychologically alienated. The wealth derived from oil 
resource exploitation and exports benefit directly only the operators of the oil industry and the bureaucrats in 
government (Owabukeruyele, 2000). Ejibunu (2007) posits that ‘the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta region 
triggered a chain of events that has led to the political and economic marginalization of the inhabitants.” 
Despite many decades of oil production in Nigeria and hundreds of billions of dollars of oil revenue (Oronto, 
et al 2003), the inhabitants of the Niger delta region especially the riverine (creeks) remain in abject poverty. 
Poverty level is about 80% while unemployment level is about 70%. They live without even the most basic 
amenities such as pipe-borne water and electricity (Ibaba, 2005). Mukagbo (2004) opines that “in the Niger 
Delta, scenes of abject poverty pervade the area, very similar to what you find in a refugee camp”. The 
distribution of resources from the federation account has been another source of marginalization for the Niger 
delta. Prior to 1999, the allocation to the Niger delta from the federation account of revenues from oil, 
decreased progressively as Nigeria became more dependent on oil. In 1960, the allocation was 50%, then 
down to 45% in 1970, declining to 20% in 1982, down to 3% in 1992. It was raised to 13% following 
persistent agitations from the Niger Deltans (Ikelegbe, 2006). Unemployment is very high among the people 
of the Niger delta. The youths from the region do not benefit from the presence of the transnational 
corporations especially the oil companies operating in their communities. Less than 5% of the people from 
the Niger delta work in the companies, while women from the region working with the oil companies are less 
than 1%. Those who benefit through employment by the oil companies are from the non -oil producing parts 
of Nigeria (Ejibunu, 2007; Brisibie, 2001). These are the major reasons for the conflict which degenerated to 
militancy and brigandage. 
 
Another major environmental tragedy in the Niger Delta is the waste of aquatic ecosystem. This aspect is 
quite significant to the people, being that it constitutes a grave threat to a hitherto economic hub of their 
lives—fishing. It is a common sight that in the process of oil exploration and production materials such as 
drill cuttings, drill mud and other fluids that are used to stimulate production are discharged into the 
environment and most end up in the streams and rivers (Nwaomah, 2009a). These chemicals are not easily 
degradable and the skimming of oil on the water surface hardly solve the problem since most of the oil might 
have sunk to the bottom of the water surface leaving grave consequences such as: (a) surface and ground 
water quality deterioration in terms of portability, aesthetic and recreation, (b) destruction and reduction of 
fish life and fisheries production of the waters, (c) destruction by acute and sublehal toxicity of aquatic flora 
and fauna of spills on water and benthic macro (Okaba, 2005: 19-20.) as shown in figure 2. 
Figure 2: Environmental degradation. 
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According to the World Bank, there are five great plagues of mankind: war, famine, pestilence, environmental 
pollution, and death. The Niger Delta is in the throes of becoming an environmental wastebasket. From the 
oil spills to the round-the-clock gas flares and effluents from industrial wastes, the fragile ecosystem of the 
Niger Delta is under constant assault. The unbridled exploitation of crude oil and natural gas beneath the 
lands of the Niger Delta has caused indescribable and irredeemable ecological devastation of the Niger Delta 
land (Azaiki, 2003). Okaba (2005) sums up the environmental impact of the oil industry in the Niger Delta 
of Nigeria as land deprivation, soil quality alteration, destruction of aquatic ecosystem and air pollution. 
Other factors responsible for the soil quality alteration are the unceasing gas flares; drill cuttings, drill mud 
and refinery waste. The harmful effects of these elements on the soil are unquestionable (Nwaomah, 2009). 
Owabukeruyele argued that the compounds from the numerous petroleum wastes contain organic chemicals 
such as phenol cyanide, sulpheide-suspended solids, chromium and biological oxygen that leave destructive 
effects on the land and water (Owabukeruyele, 2000).  A secondary source of air pollution in the Niger Delta 
is the incidents of fire resulting from leakages from the exposed and corroded oil pipes that are scattered all 
over the region (Nwaomah, 2009). The environmental degradation being carried out by the oil companies in 
the Niger Delta as a result of their non-compliance with internationally recognized environmental standards 
are damages that their consequences cannot be limited by time. Unfortunately, available evidence shows that 
the trend is worsening as the government lack the political will to ensure compliance to rules by the oil 
companies (Doran, 1995; Ojomu, 2002; Susa, 1999).  
 
Additionally, the unbridled corruption in the oil sector has thrown up numerous variables and challenges 
which further exacerbate the development challenges in the region. For instance, apart from the military 
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accused of oil theft, the militants equally engage in bunkering and other forms of brigandage to pay for 
weapons purchase. The oil corporations on their part engage in the politics of ‘divide and rule’ in which they 
identify for compensation, people in the host communities they believe have the capability to influence the 
indigenes to ensure that they have a peaceful environment to operate in, at minimal cost. A minute part of 
the money that should have been spent on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the development of the 
host communities are paid to such individuals and groups. As such in some communities, traditional rulers 
and local community leaders have become corrupt as they have become recipients of various contract awards 
and cash payments at the detriment of the communities they represent. (Kemedi, 2003). Where there has been 
crisis of leadership in the host communities, the oil producing companies have tended to support whichever 
faction they believe had the capability of disrupting its operations “as opposed to which groups or factions 
were properly constituted and traditionally legitimate” (Ikelegbe, 2006). In furtherance of this policy, the 
Shell petroleum development company (SPDC) ignored the traditional rulers and elders and accorded 
recognition, partnered and related with the youths, simply because the youths had more disruptive power on 
oil production. Therefore the youths emerged as community leaders. These youths became the power brokers, 
the liaison with the MNCs, and the object of MNCs patronage (Kemedi, 2003; Ile & Akukwe, 2001).  
 
The realization by the youths that violent protests and disruptive actions elicit immediate actions and 
payments by the oil companies led to emergence of several youth groups or militias. These youth groups 
became more daring in their tactics, from minor threats of disruption of activities emerged full blown 
militancy activities. Some youths began to hijack ships and helicopters, kidnap MNCs staff, and vandalize 
facilities in order to obtain pay offs, ransoms and payments from the oil companies (Ikelegbe, 2006). 
 
The crisis in the region arising from the activities of the different militant groups operating in the region has 
brought about some negative implications, not only on oil production and other economic activities, but also 
on governance in general (Ejibunu, 2007). The activities of the militants have impacted the Nigerian economy 
in various ways thus tanking economic development. The operations of militants in the Niger Delta and the 
insecurity it has created makes it impossible for security agencies to adequately cover locations of various 
oil facilities. This has created a veritable ground for illegal oil bunkering to thrive in the region. Estimates 
range from 30,000 to 200,000 bbl. /day (Oudeman, 2006).  Several of the militant groups are also believed 
to be involved in illegal oil bunkering. It is believed that illegal oil bunkering has become a major source of 
funding for the operations of the militants in the Niger delta. Militant warlords who engage in illegal oil 
bunkering justify their actions by claiming that it is a means of providing income for the impoverished 
residents of the oil producing communities. It is reported that one day’s worth of illegal oil bunkering in the 
Niger delta (at 100, 000 bbl. at $15bbl) will buy quality weapons for and sustain a group of 1, 500 youths for 
two months (ICG, 2006).  
 
As a result of the activities of militants in the Niger delta region, “SPDC retrenched 3, 500 workers in 
September 2007. Indoroma Petrochemical company shut down its operations thereby rendering over 3, 000 
youths jobless and aggravating the unemployment situation. Restiveness has reduced growth in the business 
sector. As a consequence of militant activity Royal Dutch Shell has seen its production dropping from one 
million bpd to about 380,000 bpd at its Bonny terminal in the South of the Delta. Exxon has also experienced 
increased insurgent activity in its Nigerian operations. Nigeria is already suffering from production slow 
down due to militancy, currently the Niger Delta is only exporting 1.8 million bpd, compared with a targeted 
2.2 million bpd (Harper, 2009). In Rivers state, over 80% of the companies have stopped operations, as 
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expatriates have either gone to their home countries or relocated to safer environments (Ejibunu, 2007). The 
MTN had 43 base stations shut down as militant activities made them inaccessible. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF AMNESTY PROGRAMME FOR EX-MILITANTS 
In 2009, the federal government introduced a programme of amnesty for all the militants in the Niger Delta, 
in which they were to return their arms and enter into the amnesty programme. This was adopted in order to 
ensure that the activities of the militants which had defied military action in the region did not lead to the 
eventual collapse of the economy. The ex-militants were to receive N65, 000 each as monthly stipend while 
they were trained on various skills both at home and abroad, to enable them gain employment and become 
re-integrated into the society. As part of the amnesty programme, several of the ex-militants were sent 
overseas to participate in skill acquisition programmes that would ensure their re-integration into the society. 
(Awosiyan, 2011).  
 
However, in spite of the enormous amount being expended on stipends for the ex-militants, skill acquisition 
and their re-integration, several controversies have trailed the amnesty programme. Prominent among the 
controversies has been the neglect of the social infrastructure in the region which has been the major cause 
of the militancy in the first place; differences in the actual number of ex-militants involved in the programme; 
as well as violent demonstrations by ex-militants from the region alleging neglect following their non-
inclusion in the amnesty programme or non-payment of their monthly stipend (Tamuno, 2012).  
 
The implementation of amnesty programme for the ex-militants has not translated to increase in the inflow 
of FDI. The recent upsurge of the level of insecurity in the region, following agitations by some “ex-militants” 
and counter claims by government agencies (especially the Amnesty programme office) shows that more 
needs to be done, to tackle the genuine demands of the people beyond “settlement” of the militants. 
 
POLITICS OF OIL IN NIGERIA. 
Oil as a natural resource of great economic value occupies prime attention in global politics; hence countries 
rely on it as means of economic survival. To this end, control of these resources, attracts political 
maneuvering found in any political system, especially resource rich and dependent countries. In Nigeria, oil 
and politics are inextricably linked as political leaders; see the control of oil resource as the ultimate control 
of political power. Consequently, there is intense contestation for political power and by extension, the 
control of oil resources of the nation (Ikelegbe, 2005) and (Obi, 2010). This made issue of oil and politics in 
Nigeria, a vexatious one. As Omoweh; (2005:50) observed, “the new found oil wealth in Nigeria introduced 
a new dimension into the country’s character of politics, particularly the intensification of the fierce struggle 
to capture and privatize the state at all cost and by all means by the political class”. Subsequently, this played 
out to the detriment of the economy as “roving bandits with the smash and grab mentality” dominated 
Nigerian political landscape (Lewis, 2010:20).  
 
The  result unfortunately, was poor development planning and where there is one, lack of the political will to 
faithfully see it through, (Henley et al, 2012). To understand the weight oil and politics carries in the political 
economy of the Nigerian state, this piece will briefly consider the following sub-topic with a view to 
exploring in compact form, how ‘oil and politics interface’ shape the Nigerian political cum developmental 
process. Consequently, focus will be on issue of revenue allocation and the kind of politics it spurns and how 
same shape development. 
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This is one issue that shows manifestation of oil politics in Nigeria. It entails processes that have to do with 
how oil revenues are shared in the Nigerian federal system that is fraught with politics seen in the struggle 
between and among the largely dominated ethic interest in Nigeria. Ikeji; (2011) stated that, “the struggle for 
the control of the nation’s resources have also, to some extent been based on the regional cleavages”. The 
Nigerian state is made up of six geo-political zones with three dominant ethnic groups alongside numerous 
minority groups seen mostly among the oil bearing Delta region and the middle belt. There is obvious 
political struggle for oil wealth as each region often represented by an ethnic group, angle for ample resource 
space. One way this is made known, is how benefits are allocated from generated revenue in the revenue 
sharing formula that is seen to be a political instrument to press for advantage.  
 
Revenue allocation principles adjudged skewed in favour of major ethnic groups at the expense of minorities, 
gained currency following the discovery of oil and exploration of same in commercial quantities in the 1953s. 
Prior to oil, revenue sharing formula that adopted derivation principle, paid regions from where applicable 
resources were sourced, 50% of the total revenue generated. This was however short-lived as the derivation 
principle was though retained, but applicable percentage kept dropping in the following sequence. It changed 
from 50% to 25% between 1968-1980 and miserable 1.5% between 1980-1989, (Akpabio and Akpan 2010) 
when oil was discovered. The politics that followed and later came to be known as the politics of revenue 
sharing formula as we earlier observed, is seen by many as direct political war between majority tribes and 
the minority tribes for the soul of the Nigerian oil. This to a very large extent amplifies what has come to be 
seen as oil politics in Nigeria.  
 
Subtle and overt moves by regions to have fairer share in the revenue sharing regimes as well as the twist 
and the rancor that followed, which manifest in the polity, what many call ‘politics of oil’ in Nigeria 
(Ikelegbe, 2005, Obi, 2010, Ikeji, 2011, Omeje, 2006, Yusuf-Bagaji et al, 2011 and Higgins, 2009). The 
Nigerian federal system largely seen as flawed comes readily to mind when the issue of oil politics in Nigeria 
is up for analysis. This is particularly of interest when seen from the prism of distributive justice in the 
distribution of Nigeria oil resources wherein acceptable formula for sharing oil wealth, has remain an issue. 
Minority groups in Nigeria have severally seen issues associated with revenue sharing in Nigeria as a struggle 
to outdo the majority to outdo them by espousing unfavourable revenue sharing formula from the center 
government dominated largely by the majority tribes of Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba. Effort at amending the 
nation’s constitution recently, exposed the regional dimension of the angling for the soul of oil money. While 
governors of the oil rich South-South region wanted increased allocation, those of the North, wanted the 
status quo of 13% the South-South presently enjoys, to remain. 
 
OIL, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT  
Apart from the usually cited resource curse effect that appear to have denied Nigeria commensurate 
development, the debilitating role of politics in the oil industry, appears to have equally contributed. Intricate 
mingling of politics with oil curse, appear to interact to the detriment of the nation and at the expense of 
envisaged development at the discovery of oil in 1956. Evidence of these manifests in many ways such as 
rent-seeking which came into being when oil was discovered in 1956. This culminated in the attendant 
resource curse malaise that became the lot of Nigeria.  While oil rents should be seen as a tool for economic 
growth via investment to achieve development that which accrued to the Nigerian state was seen by the 
political class as what they should fight for at the detriment of development. Ikelegbe (2005) captured this in 
his piece where he chronicled the political economy of rents in the Nigerian oil industry. He however failed 
to expose the character of the Nigerian political elites that fuels rent-seeking at development expense. The 
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Nigerian elite as shown in the course of this analysis is corrupt. As Nwabuzor (2006) noted, corruption fuels 
the culture of rent-seeking and fritters away development. Consequently, accruable oil rents become 
insufficient to meet the nation’s developmental targets. In such situation, development goals become 
unachievable both at the national and at the regional level. This runs contrary to what happens in the 1960s 
where agro based resources sustained the economy.  Apart from making it impossible for oil wealth to impact 
the nation in development terms; creates the atmosphere of rancor that accentuates crisis owing to grievance 
arising from the inequality in the sharing of oil resources. Distributive injustice is singled out as the main 
cause of the Niger Delta crisis (Ikelegbe, 2005, Obi, 2010, Ikeji, 2011, Omeje, 2006, Yusuf-Bagaji, 2011 and 
Higgins, 2009). The end result is the disruptive effect of oil and politics dynamics that has led to the seeming 
failure of oil wealth to positively impact the development process in Nigeria.  
 
Secondly, oil-politics dynamic and impact of same on the Nigerian state, has led to the neglect of key sectors 
of the economy capable of helping the nation navigate the path of development. Elite induced struggle for oil 
wealth laced with primordial interest, made it possible for the nation and managers of state affairs, to neglect 
key sectors of the economy capable of engendering development. The prime casualty here is the agricultural 
sector that once sustained the economy. Self-interest with regional and ethnic coloration that dominated the 
Nigerian political scene after the discovery and exploration of oil was to later manifest in the management of 
oil wealth.  
 
The manifestation of the political impact on the economy owing to the oil politics was the inchoate planning 
environment that failed to help the nation achieve needed development. The nation became largely dependent 
on oil to the neglect of other sectors that could drive development process. This contrasted sharply with the 
agro sector based economy that existed immediately after independence that saw healthy competition among 
the regions. The West built the cocoa house in Ibadan among other things; the North built Ahmadu Bello 
University 
 
in Zaria while the East concentrated on the development of Enugu as their model of development. 
Development at the regional levels took root from this but such gains were reversed with the avoidable 
struggle for oil that accompanied the oil economy. Gradual alteration of the revenue allocation formulae to 
the detriment of oil bearing region and eventual abandonment of the lands, crippled regional efforts at 
developing. Planning was not spared as it was politicized (Henley et al 2012).  
 
Thirdly, oil politics in Nigeria, brought about corruption in a new dimension. As expected, this came with 
disruptive effects on the nation’s developmental efforts. With oil and the struggle for the control of same, 
new class of state actors emerged. They emerged with clientelistic mindset ostensibly to amass wealth at the 
expense of the state. While this happens, national interest is seen as secondary but regional and often times, 
primordial interest, given a vent. With corruption closely linked to the resource curse debate that the Nigerian 
state suffers from, (Shaxson, 2007), one can then situate the problem of corruption in the Nigerian oil 
dominated economy properly. What this means is that, corruption is an unethical conduct by those saddled 
with responsibility of public trust at the expense of public interest. This depicts exactly what happens in the 
Nigerian oil industry that is prone to political manipulation.  
 
Corruption is disruptive anywhere anytime but oil related corruption as in the case of Nigeria, has a far more 
damaging impact on the nation’s economy and development process. Corruption in the oil sector in Nigeria 
as Gillies; (2009) noted, “manifest in the award of oil licenses, avoidable bottlenecks in the oil industry, 
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shabby process of crude oil sale and import of refined products and that associated with accounting for 
accruable revenue from the sale of oil in Nigeria.” These tend to accentuate and fuel corrupting tendency 
amongst public officials as they see corrupt enrichment of selves at the expense of the state, as their 
opportunity to partake of the ‘national cake’. Such thinking, receives impetus from strong primordial 
attachment that thrives on ethnic sentiment. This is the story of oil politics in Nigeria especially when oil 
wealth, fuels corruption and patronage politics that have national development prostrate, (Obi, 2010).  
 
Finally, oil politics in Nigeria, led to infrastructural decay. With the mix-up of politics and oil, the resultant 
effect is the “smash and grab” mentality that elites adopt (Henley et al, 2012). This can be likened to idea of 
“roving bandits” which Olson; (2000) espoused, mentioned by (Lewis, 2010) as manifest in Nigeria. While 
the nation basked in the euphoria of oil discovery with renewed hope of improved infrastructural facilities, 
the reverse turned out to be the case. This can be seen from the manifest neglect of infrastructural facilities 
where they exist. Roads in the oil bearing region of the Niger Delta are reportedly in bad shape as it is the 
case in several parts of the nation despite the huge amount budgeted yearly for their construction and repairs. 
Where they exist, there is manifest failure of the state to maintain such infrastructural facilities, leading to 
inevitable decay. From poorly maintained roads, poor health facilities, near non-functional social services, 
epileptic power supply, comatose industrial base and manufacturing sector and so much more, the Nigerian 
state is marked by dearth of infrastructure worsened by poor maintenance culture. Misplaced priority of the 
ruling elites who are often drawn into the struggle for oil wealth that leaves them engrossed with what they 
can grab from the national cake which the oil wealth represents and not how to develop the nation, make this 
so. We can thus say that the willful neglect of infrastructural facilities in Nigeria represents the flip-side of 
oil politics in Nigeria. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Since the discovery of oil in Nigeria, it has been a major propellant of the Nigerian economy; however the 
primitive accumulation of wealth by the Nigerian elite has hindered a smooth development process in the 
country. The struggles for power among the elites brought about several military coups and to a civil war 
which eventually led to the abolition of the principle of derivation that was anchored in the 1963 Republican 
Constitution. In view of the foregoing the following recommendations are made:  
 
• Proper macro-economic policies should be drafted in order to boost the Nigerian economy and enable 
Nigeria participate in international division of labour. 
• Accountability and transparency by the ruling elite should not be taken with levity. 
• The issues of environmental degradation should be seriously tackled because it negatively affects the 
wellbeing of the people. 
• Infrastructural development should be put in place in oil producing states. 
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